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“Our post-truth moment is all Thomas Kuhn’s fault,” would be an unfair summation of The 
Ashtray—but only just. Kuhn achieved prominence with The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). 
Science, it contended, does not generate incrementally truer descriptions of reality, but develops 
through radical paradigm shifts, one understanding of the world capitulating to a new, 
incompatible understanding that better solves the puzzles scientists set for themselves. Kuhn’s 
theory of scientific revolutions motivated expansions and reactions that reconfigured the history 
and philosophy of science. 
Errol Morris, an acclaimed documentary filmmaker who briefly studied under Kuhn at 
Princeton, instead remembers the acerbic philosopher for flinging the titular ashtray at him in 
1972. Morris hurls The Ashtray back, targeting not Kuhn’s person, but his legacy. Structure, Morris 
writes, brutalized the truth, and Kuhn was an avatar of postmodernism who rejected the external 
world’s very existence. Deep personal animosity—so overt that he compares Kuhn to Hitler in his 
acknowledgments—fuels Morris’s critiques. 
A filmmaker’s sensibility informs the book’s cadence; rather than demonstrating Kuhn’s 
errors, Morris conjures an image of his wrongness. He interweaves philosophical explication, 
literary allusion that careens between the highbrow and the low, interviews with authoritative 
figures, and copious illustrations. Incommensurability is his principle target. Kuhn’s notion that 
adherents of one paradigm inhabit a different mental world from, and cannot communicate 
meaningfully with, those of another is the most radical element of his philosophy. Morris, who 
favors Saul Kripke’s causal theory of reference, considers incommensurability to be epistemic 
anarchy. For Kripke, theoretical commitments do not bedevil our linguistic reference to things in 
the world. Morris adjudges Kripke’s philosophy a firm foundation for scientific knowledge, setting 
up a choice: “Does science progress toward a more truthful apperception of the physical world? Or 
is it all a matter of opinion, a sociological phenomenon that reflects consensus, not truth?” (2). 
Hard-nosed scientific certitude or frothy-lipped relativism? 
This dyad, too neat to encapsulate Kuhn’s legacy, recalls Morris Zapp, the bumptious 
protagonist of David Lodge’s Changing Places. Zapp had a mission: a series of Jane Austen 
commentaries so panoptic “that when each commentary was written there would be simply nothing 
further to say about the novel in question.” The joke, of course, is the perfect totality with which 
any such endeavor escapes the point. We don’t study literature in search of finality, but to enable 
new ways of thinking. Daniel Dennett makes a similar suggestion about philosophy, asking 
whether it would be preferable to be so definitively correct that you foreclose an area of inquiry, or 
to err so spectacularly that people debate your blunders for centuries. Scientists tend to choose the 
former, philosophers the latter. 
Kuhn had many fecund failures. Structure, for all its flaws—many of Morris’s specific 
critiques are apt—forced new, fruitful approaches to tricky questions about how scientific truth 
claims arise in practice. Morris might even have been inclined to agree, if not for the depth of his 
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animus. “The role of a good documentary,” he once told the Boston Globe, “is not to convince you 
about what happened, but to force you to think about what happened.” A poignant, staccato 
sequence in Morris’s The Fog of War juxtaposes documents reporting Vietnam War casualties with 
stark images of the human beings whose suffering and death those charts—inked onto US Letter, 
mimeographed, and filed in triplicate—described. It makes us think about the difference between 
abstract and actual war. A similar distinction applies within philosophy of science. Theories of 
reason and reference describe the clean, ideal ways that our minds might latch onto the world. But 
the practice of science is far messier than those theories suggest. 
Kuhn sensitized historians and philosophers to that messiness. He wondered how 
philosophy of science would have to adapt if it countenanced the historical processes by which 
scientists actually achieved understanding. Close scrutiny reveals those processes to be profoundly 
dissimilar to the tidy philosophical frameworks Morris favors, which are little informed by, and 
have scarcely influenced, the practices that provide the sturdiest accounts of the natural world. 
Morris charges Kuhn with undermining the truth and authority of science. But that 
authority, the crux of cultural battles over climate change and evolution, has less to do with 
abstract, transcendent truth than with reliability, consensus, and the social processes that enable 
them. The ironclad truth Morris seeks, so integral to the popular image of science, is one of 
science’s greatest vulnerabilities. A responsible scientist will always admit doubt. Combined with 
the widespread perception that science seeks irreproachable truth, that is a powerful weapon for 
those who would undermine scientific authority. 
Thomas Kuhn was unkind to Errol Morris. By all accounts, he was often unkind. That 
kindness and influence so frequently fail to intersect is a bitter injustice. But so too is vilification 
in the service of vendetta. 
